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NOTES
LOUISIANA'S NEW JOINT CUSTODY LAW
A separation or divorce proceeding traditionally has resulted in
an award of sole custody of any minor children of the marriage to
one of the parents, even when both parents have been willing and
fit to have custody.1 This result may be unfair to the child, the non-
custodial parent, and even the custodial parent, who may have dif-
ficulty bearing the burden of sole custody.2 Many courts and
legislatures have decided that it is sometimes better to place the child
in the custody of both parents by awarding joint custody.' This solu-
tion has been accepted by the Louisiana Legislature in a recently
enacted law which establishes a preference for joint custody.4 The
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. See, e.g., Cooley v. Cooley, 411 So. 2d 750 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); Jowers v.
Jowers, 393 So. 2d 790 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981); Kerr v. Kerr, 349 So. 2d 913 (La. App.
lst Cir. 1977).
2. See M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT; THE CASE FOR JOINT
CUSTODY 73-79 (1978); Comment, Joint Custody in Louisiana, 43 LA. L. REV. 85, 98-99 (1982).
3. See, e.g., Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 432 A.2d 63 (1981); Perotti v. Perotti, 78
Misc. 2d 131, 355 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sup. Ct. 1974); CAL. CIV. CODE S 4600.5 (Supp. 1982); MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. S 722.26a (Supp. 1982).
4. 1982 La. Acts, No. 307, S 1. This Act amended LA. CIv. CODE arts. 146, 157,
& 250 and LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4262.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 146 provides:
A. If there are children of the marriage whose provisional custody is claimed
by both husband and wife, the suit being yet pending and undecided, custody
shall be awarded in the following order of preference, according to the best in-
terest of the children:
(1) To both parents jointly. The court, shall, unless waived by the court for
good cause shown, require the parents to submit a plan for implementation of
the custody order, or the parents acting individually or in concert may submit
a custody implementation plan to the court prior to issuance of a custody decree.
Such plan may include such considerations as the following:
(a) Domiciliary arrangements for the child or children.
(b) Rights of access and communication between the respective parents and
the child or children.
(c) Child support, if appropriate to the economic circumstances of the parents.
(d) Any other matter deemed in the best interest of the child or children.
(2) To either parent. In making an order of custody to either parent, the court
shall consider, among other factors, which parent is more likely to allow the child
or children frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent, and
shall not prefer a parent as custodian because of that parent's sex. The burden
of proof that joint custody would not be in a child's best interest shall be upon
the parent requesting sole custody.
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new law deserves analysis as it significantly changes Louisiana custody
law.
(3) If to neither parent, to the person or persons in whose home the child
has been living in a wholesome and stable environment.
(4) To any other person or persons deemed by the court to be suitable and
able to provide an adequate and stable environment.
B. Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or per-
sons other than a parent without the consent of the parents, it shall make a find-
ing that an award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child and
the award to a nonparent is required to serve the best interest of the child. Allega-
tions that parental custody would be detrimental to the child, other than a state-
ment of that ultimate fact, shall not appear in the pleadings.
C. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in the best
interest of a minor child unless:
(1) The parents have agreed to an award of custody to one parent or so agree
in open court at a hearing for the purpose of determining the custody of a minor
child of the marriage; or
(2) The court finds that joint custody would not be in the best interest of
the child.
For the purpose of assisting the court in making a determination whether an
award of joint custody is appropriate, the court may direct that an investigation
be conducted.
D. For purposes of this Article, "joint custody" shall mean the parents shall
share the physical custody of children of the marriage, subject to any plan of
implementation effected pursuant to Paragraph A of this Article, and shall enjoy
the natural cotutorship of such children in accordance with Article 250. Physical
care and custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way as to assure a
child of frequent and continuing contact with both parents. An award of joint
custody obligates the parties to exchange information concerning the health, educa-
tion, and welfare of the minor child; and, unless allocated, apportioned, or decreed,
the parents or parties shall confer with one another in the exercise of decision-
making rights, responsibilities, and authority.
E. Any order for joint custody, or any plan of implementation effected pur-
suant to Paragraph A of this Article, may be modified or terminated upon the
petition of one or both parents or on the court's own motion, if it is shown that
the best interest of the child requires modification or termination of the order.
The court shall state in its decision the reasons for modification or termination
of the joint custody order if either parent opposes the modification or termina-
tion order.
F. Any order for the custody of a minor child of a marriage entered by a
court in this state or in any other state, subject to jurisdictional requirements,
may be modified at any time to an order of joint custody in accordance with
the provisions of this Article.
G. A custody hearing may be held in private chambers of the judge.
H. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, access to records and infor-
mation pertaining to a minor child, including but not limited to medical, dental,
and school records, shall not be denied to a parent because the parent is not
the child's custodial parent.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 157 provides:
A. In all cases of separation and divorce, and change of custody after an original
award, permanent custody of the child or children shall be granted to the parents
in accordance with Article 146.
B. If subsequent to the granting of a divorce or separation one of the parties
to the marriage dies and is survived by a minor child or children of the marriage,
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Act 307 of 1982 amended Civil Code articles 146 and 157. The
standards in amended article 146 apply to all custody cases, either
directly, through the operation of article 146, or indirectly, through
the reference in article 157 to article 146.1 Amended article 146
preserves the requirement that custody be awarded in accordance with
the best interest of the child, but it also establishes an order of
preference among the possible custody awards.' There is a rebuttable
presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of the child,7
and as a result, joint custody is first in the order of preference If
the presumption in favor of joint custody is inapplicable, or if a parent
requesting sole custody discharges his burden of proof that joint
custody is not in the child's best interest, sole custody should be
awarded.9 The third and fourth preferences allow the court to award
custody to a nonparent, a possibility which previously was not
legislatively recognized." Custody can be awarded to a nonparent,
however, only if the court finds that an award to a parent would be
detrimental to the child." In addition to the new provisions for custody
awards, amended article 146 states that a noncustodial parent shall
not be denied access to important records and information pertaining
to his minor child because he is not the child's custodial parent." Thus,
besides establishing a preference for joint custody and allowing
custody awards to nonparents, the new law redefines the limits of
sole custody.
Past Jurisprudence
Prior to legislation expressly permitting it," Louisiana courts pro-
hibited arrangements similar to joint custody. In the 1933 case of
the parents of such deceased party may have reasonable visitation rights to the
child or children of the marriage during their minority, if the court in its discre-
tion finds that such visitation rights would be in the best interests of the child
or children.
5. Article 157 states that permanent custody shall be awarded "To the parents
in accordance with article 146." (emphasis added). Although article 146 allows custody
pending the litigation to be awarded to nonparents, the apparently limiting language
of article 157 might be construed to prevent awards of permanent custody to non-
parents. On the other hand, the limitation in article 157 may have been an oversight,
the true legislative intent being to incorporate all of article 146 into article 157.
6. LA. CiV. CODE art. 146(A).
7. LA. CiV. CODE art. 146(C).
8. LA. Crv. CODE art. 146(A)(1).
9. LA. CiV. CODE art. 146(A)(2).
10. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 146 & 157 (prior to 1982 amendments). Custody awards to
nonparents were recognized in the jurisprudence. See infra notes 81 & 82 and accom-
panying text.
11. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146(B).
12. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146(H).
13. Act 283 of 1981 amended Civil Code articles 146 and 157 to permit joint custody
for the first time in Louisiana.
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Newson v. Newson," the original custody decree had granted each of
the parents custody of the child for alternating periods of six months.
The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected that arrangement, stating that
custody of a child following separation should be granted to only one
of the parents. The court reasoned that alternating custody would
result in a division of parental authority, which was not in the best
interest of the child. After Newson, "divided" or "part time" custody
was considered to be prohibited. 5 More recent cases disallowed liberal
visitation that was said to amount to divided custody." The reason-
ing of Newson was also reflected in several cases which indicated that
liberal visitation would be disallowed only when it resulted in a divi-
sion of parental authority. 7 Thus, the new statute's presumption that
joint custody is in the best interest of the child is a clear derogation
from prior Louisiana jurisprudence. Therefore, Louisiana courts may
be inclined to give the joint custody provisions of amended article
146 a restrictive interpretation. 8
Further evidence that joint custody is contrary to judicially
developed standards for child custody cases is found in the reliance
on stability of environment as a factor in determining the best interest
of the child. 9 In a 1980 change of custody case, Bordelon v. Bordelon, °
the supreme court said, "Generally, it might not be in the best interest
of a child to be regularly moved from parent to parent."" Although
the court also noted that the stability factor must be weighed with
the other relevant factors in determining what is in the child's best
interest, the court concluded that "the stability factor [weighed] heavily
in favor of the mother, since she was the parent most intimately in-
14. 176 La. 694, 146 So. 472 (1933).
15. See Schexnayder v. Schexnayder, 343 So. 2d 393 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
16. Sims v. Sims, 340 So. 2d 397 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); LeBouef v. LeBouef,
325 So. 2d 290 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Litton v. Litton, 299 So. 2d 458 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1974); Poole v. Poole, 270 So. 2d 215 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972); Ogden v. Ogden,
220 So. 2d 241 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); Bush v. Bush, 163 So. 2d 858 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1964).
17. D'Armond v. D'Armond, 405 So. 2d 1231 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981); Johnson
v. Johnson, 357 So. 2d 69 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Doherty v. Mertens, 326 So. 2d
405 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Pate v. Pate, 348 So. 2d 1338 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977);
Spencer v. Spencer, 273 So. 2d 605 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Vinet v. Vinet, 184 So.
2d 33 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); Holley v. Holley, 158 So. 2d 620 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
18. In Scott v. Scott, 417 So. 2d 489 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), the first circuit nar-
rowly construed the joint custody provisions of article 157 because, prior to legisla-
tion permitting joint custody, it was prohibited by the jurisprudence. 417 So. 2d at
491-92.
19. See Bordelon v. Bordelon, 390 So. 2d 1325 (La. 1980); Cleeton v. Cleeton, 383
So. 2d 1231 (La. 1980).
20. 390 So. 2d 1325 (La. 1980).
21. Id. at 1329.
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volved with raising the child and had only lost custody for a short
while in comparison to the child's age."22 This reasoning conflicts with
the presumption in favor of joint custody because joint custody necessari-
ly involves the child spending time with two custodial parents who
live apart.' Hence Bordelon indicates that Louisiana courts, as men-
tioned previously, may tend to give the new joint custody law a restric-
tive interpretation. 4
The Rebuttable Presumption
The fact that Louisiana courts have not favored joint custody is
important because the essential provisions of the new law are am-
biguous. Whether there will be a significant change in the nature of
custody awards depends on how the courts interpret the new law.
The interpretation given to the provisions establishing the presump-
tion in favor of joint custody will be especially important. Article 146(C)
provides in part: "There shall be a rebuttable presumption that joint
custody is in the best interest of a minor child unless: (1) The parents
have agreed to an award of custody to one parent . . .; or (2) The
court finds that joint custody would not be in the best interest of
the child." Although the presumption is very strong, both exceptions
can be interpreted broadly so as to limit the applicability of the
presumption and diminish the effect of the new law.
The first exception to the presumption in favor of joint custody-
the parents have agreed to an award of custody to one parent-can
be interpreted two ways. It may mean that the presumption does not
apply if the parents agree that joint custody should not be awarded,
regardless of which of them is awarded sole custody, or it may mean
that the presumption does not apply when one parent acquiesces to
the other parent's having custody. The former interpretation should
not be followed since it would allow the parents to circumvent the
legislative preference for joint custody by agreeing to engage in a
sole custody dispute. In light of the past jurisprudence," such
agreements could easily become common practice, resulting in infre-
quent application of the presumption in favor of joint custody.
22. Id. The supreme court also noted the importance of giving custody to the
parent "most intimately involved" with the child's care in Cleeton v. Cleeton, 383 So.
2d 1231, 1236 (La. 1980).
23. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146(D).
24. The fact that there have been very few joint custody cases since the joint
custody legislation of 1981 is yet another indication that the courts do not favor joint
custody. Louisiana courts could have remanded suitable custody cases with directions
for the parents to consider joint custody as an alternative. This has been done in
other states. See In Re Marriage of Levin, 102 Cal. App. 3d 981, 162 Cal. Rep. 757 (1980).
25. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
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However, if the latter interpretation is adopted -the presumption does
not apply when one parent consents to the other's taking custody-
the presumption would still apply in most cases. This interpretation
would simply allov the court to disregard the presumption in favor
of joint custody when rendering a consent judgment of sole custody."
Thus, the latter interpretation should be adopted because it is more
consistent with the apparent legislative purpose of establishing a
preference for joint custody.
The second exception to the presumption in favor of joint
custody-the court finds that joint custody would not be in the best
interest of the child-is even more problematic. A literal interpreta-
tion of the presumption and its second exception suggests that joint
custody is presumed to be in the child's best interest unless it is not
in the child's best interest. Such a literal interpretation would negate
the effect of the presumption in favor of joint custody, since the
assumption of fact triggered by the presumption would be contingent
upon a determination of that same fact. If the presumption were given
such a limited effect, the basis for the preference of joint custody
over sole custody would be largely eliminated. Furthermore, the ap-
parent existence of a strong presumption in favor of joint custody
would be misleading and potentially harmful to the interests of all
parties concerned.
Another interpretation of the second exception is that it merely
reaffirms the rebuttable nature of the presumption in favor of joint
custody. Under this interpretation the exception is, at best, redun-
dant and, at worst, a point of possible confusion which is also poten-
tially harmful to interested parties.
A third interpretation is that the second exception is intended
to allow a court to find that the presumption in favor of joint custody
is not applicable even when neither parent has requested an award
of sole custody.27 The exception might be considered necessary in this
instance since otherwise the presumption would require an award of
joint custody.' This third interpretation is supported by the allowance
in article 146 of a court-ordered investigation as to whether joint
custody is in the child's best interest. This interpretation preserves
the effect of the presumption in favor of joint custody and is consis-
26. The general practice of the courts is to automatically award sole custody to
the parent who requests it when the other parent consents to such an award. The
practice is justified in that it is probably not in the child's best interest for custody
to be awarded to a parent who either cannot or will not seek custody.
27. This would usually occur where the parents were requesting joint custody.
28. Relevant sections of article 146 provide: "custody shall be awarded ... accord-
ing to the best interest of the children .... There shall be a rebuttable presumption
that joint custody is in the best interest of a minor child ....
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tent with the legislature's apparent intention to insure that joint
custody will be awarded in accordance with the child's best interest.
It is not clear which interpretation of the presumption and its
exceptions the legislature intended.' Further legislative action is
needed to clarify the meaning of article 146. Nevertheless, the new
law will be analyzed herein under the premise that there is an effec-
tive presumption in favor of joint custody.
The Definition of Joint Custody
Article 146(D) states in part: "For purposes of this Article, 'joint
custody' shall mean the parents shall share the physical custody of
children of the marriage, subject to any plan of implementation ef-
fected pursuant to Paragraph A of this Article, and shall enjoy the
natural cotutorship of such children in accordance with Article 250."
Prior to amendment, articles 146 and 157 allowed but did not require
joint custodial parents to share physical custody." The definition of
joint custody in amended article 146 changes the law to require that
joint custodial parents share physical custody. Although the change
is significant, it is mitigated by the limitation subjecting the require-
ment of shared physical custody to any plan for implementation of
joint custody. Since article 146(A)(1) expressly permits the joint
custody plan to specify a domicile for the child,31 an equal sharing
of physical custody is not required. On the other hand, a custodial
parent is prevented from monopolizing physical custody by the arti-
cle 146(D) requirement that "[p]hysical care and custody shall be shared
by the parents in such a way as to assure a child of frequent and
continuing contact with both parents." Thus, joint custody means that
at a minimum, both parents shall have frequent and continuing con-
tact with the child.
Joint custody also means that the parents are natural cotutors
of the child. Cotutorship obligates each of the parents to rear and
educate the child in accordance with his station in life.2 It also re-
quires the parents to act as prudent administrators of the child's prop-
erty, to enforce all obligations in the child's favor, and to represent
the child in all civil matters.' Although the parents will automatical-
ly share these responsibilities equally, they may redistribute the
obligations of cotutorship by agreement, subject to approval of the
29. The legislative history of the bill does not indicate that the legislature noticed
any ambiguity in the wording of article 146.
30. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 146(B) & 157(B) (as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 283, S 1).
31. See infra notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text.
32. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4261.
33. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4262 (as amended by 1982 La. Acts, No. 307, S 2).
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court awarding joint custody.34 In addition, the court may modify the
cotutorship on its own motion.' Regardless of how the cotutorship
is modified, however, "[a]n award of joint custody obligates the par-
ties to exchange information concerning the health, education, and
welfare of the minor child."3
"[U]nless allocated, apportioned, or decreed, the parents or par-
ties shall confer with one another in the exercise of decision-making
rights, responsibilities, and authority."37 Apparently, an agreement be-
tween the parents is not required in cases where the right or respon-
sibility has already been "allocated, apportioned, or decreed," and it
will be sufficient if the acting parent consults with the other parent.
The Presumption and the Best Interest Standard
The presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of the
child will probably change the factors which traditionally have been
considered in determining the best interest of the child. As already
noted, the presumption is contrary to the judicially expressed
preference for stability of environment and undivided parental
authority.38 Once the presumption is effective, the importance of these
factors, as they traditionally have been applied, should decrease in
deference to the legislation. However, the legislative history of Act
307 indicates that both factors should still be given significant weight.
The original bill was amended to allow (but not require) the joint
custody plan to specify "domiciliary arrangements."39 The legislative
history establishes that "domiciliary arrangements" refers to a single
residence,' an indication that the legislature intended to permit the
child in a joint custody arrangement to have one home. If this is the
case, the judicial preference for stability of environment and undivid-
ed parental authority may still be important. Because of their
34. LA. CIV. CODE art. 250 (as amended by 1982 La. Acts, No. 307, S 1) provides, in
pertinent part:
[If the parents are awarded joint custody of a minor child, then the cotutorship
of the minor child shall belong to both parents, with equal authority, privileges,
and responsibilities, unless modified by order of the court or by an agreement-
of the parents, approved by the court awarding joint custody.
35. LA. CiV. CODE art. 250.
36. LA. CM. CODE art. 146(D).
37. LA. CM. CODE art. 146(D).
38. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
39. Compare La. H.B. 1194, 8th Reg. Sess. (1982) (as introduced) with La. H.B.
1194 8th Reg. Sess. (1982) (as enrolled) (showing that the bill was amended to allow
the joint custody plan to specify domiciliary arrangements).
40. This is evident from the hearing on La. H.B. 1194 which was held before the
House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure. (Recordings of this hearing were made.)
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preference for a "one home" situation, Louisiana courts may require
that joint custody plans minimize instability of environment. The same
policy may result in a limitation on the division of parental authority,
since the parent with whom the child is domiciled will naturally assume
responsibility for many of the day-to-day decisions which, as a prac-
tical matter, cannot be decided by both parents."
Despite the legislative history and jurisprudence, domiciliary ar-
rangements in the joint custody plan are merely optional, and nothing
in article 146 prohibits an equal sharing of physical custody. A child,
in effect, may have two homes because the statutory definition of joint
custody requires parents to share custody "in such a way as to assure
a child of frequent and continuing contact with both parents."4 In-
deed, this provision may limit the extent to which the courts can allow
the child to have a single domicile. Hence the interpretation of "fre-
quent and continuing" will be critical.
The determination in prior jurisprudence of the point at which
joint custody begins43 might be utilized to define "frequent and contin-
uing." The maximum amount of contact previously allowed in a sole
custody arrangement with liberal visitation could be considered the
minimum necessary for the frequent and continuing contact required
when joint custody is awarded. This interpretation of "frequent and
continuing" should be made cautiously, however, because, in
establishing the requirements of joint custody, the legislature may
not have considered the nature of custody arrangements which
previously had been judicially prohibited.
Another factor which may become less important under the new
law is the relative fitness of the parents. The requirement that the
court "inquire into the fitness of both the mother and father"" has
been removed from article 146. Although parental fitness45 is surely
still relevant to the best interest of the child, its importance may
decrease for several reasons. The presumption in favor of joint
custody eliminates the need for each parent to prove that he or she
41. An effort by the courts to minimize instability of environment and division
of parental authority would be supported by the commentaries of a number of writers.
One of the chief criticisms of joint custody is the so-called "yo-yo effect" it produces.
See Comment, supra note 2, at 94.
42. LA. CFV. CODE art. 146(D).
43. See supra notes 16 & 17 and accompanying text.
44. LA. CIV. CODE art. 146(A) (prior to amendment by 1982 La. Acts, No. 307, 5 1).
45. Parental fitness has been interpreted to mean moral, physical, mental, and
economic fitness. See Comment, supra note 2, at 104.
46. In recent years the "fitness" requirements, particularly those for "moral fitness,"
have become less important. See Cleeton v. Cleeton, 383 So. 2d 1231 (La. 1980); Mon-
sour v. Monsour, 347 So. 2d 203 (La. 1977).
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is more fit than the other parent.47 When joint custody is awarded,
it does not matter which parent is "more fit," so long as both are
fit. Furthermore, a parent seeking sole custody may be discouraged
from attacking the fitness of the other parent since article 146 re-
quires that a court awarding sole custody consider which parent is
more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with
the noncustodial parent.48 An attack upon the fitness of the other
parent, especially an unwarranted attack, is likely to be perceived
as an unwillingness to cooperate with the other parent or to allow
the other parent to have frequent access to the child. 9 Thus, such
an attack could prove to be contrary to the interest of the parent
seeking sole custody.
An interesting result of the new law.is the possibility of award-
ing joint custody when neithereparent is fit for sole custody.5 0 Since
the parents have greater rights to the child than nonparents, the court
in most cases will be required to award either joint or sole custody.5"
A situation may occur in which, although neither parent is fit for sole
custody, both parents are fit for joint custody. Since joint custody
requires a sharing of custody, it may be less demanding on each parent
than sole custody.5" Thus, a parent marginally unfit for sole custody
may be fit for joint custody. In this instance the court cannot reject
an award of joint custody to the parents because the court finds that
an award to a nonparent would be in the best interest of the child,
for article 146(B) specifically provides that custody cannot be awarded
to a nonparent unless an award to a parent would be "detrimental"
to the child. Thus, joint custody will be awarded when neither parent
is particularly fit for sole custody, even though a third party is fit,
if joint custody will not be detrimental to the child.
In addition to decreasing the importance of certain factors, the
presumption in favor of joint custody is likely to require considera-
tion of some new factors.' For example, Louisiana courts will have
47. See, e.g., Cooley v. Cooley, 411 So. 2d 750 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); Jowers v.
Jowers, 393 So. 2d 790 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
48. LA. CIV. CODE art. 146(A)(2).
49. J. Cook, Joint Custody, Sole Custody: A New Statute Reflects a New Perspec-
tive, 18 CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 31 (1980). The author of this article is the president of
the Joint Custody Association which drafted the model law upon which Civil Code
article 146 is based. The provision in question was designed to encourage joint custody,
whether or not it has that effect.
50. See generally Comment, supra note 2, at 104-105.
51. LA. CiV. CODE art. 146(B). See the discussion of the order of preference in supra
notes 10 & 11 and accompanying text.
52. M. MORGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, JOINT CUSTODY 66-68 (1981).
53. For a number of relevant factors, see generally MICH. COmP. LAWS ANN.
722.26a (Supp. 1982); 1982 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 96 (West); Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J.
480, 432 A.2d 63 (1981); Comment, supra note 2, at 104-05.
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to consider the capacity of the parents to cooperate in child-rearing. 5"
Another important factor will be the logistical or practical ar-
rangements of the joint custody plan.55 Although not determinative,
practical considerations, such as geographical location and integration
of custody arrangements with work and school schedules, will be im-
portant in deciding what is in the child's best interest.' Finally, it
will be important to consider the chance of a dispute arising which
could not be settled withoute an adverse effect on the child.
Joint Custody Plans
Article 146(A) provides in part:
[C]ustody shall be awarded in the following order of preference,
according to the best interest of the children: (1) To both parents
jointly. The court, shall, unless waived by the court for good cause
shown, require the parents to submit a plan for implementation
of the custody order, or the parents acting individually or in con-
cert may submit a custody implementation plan to the court prior
to issuance of a custody decree.57
Does this mean that the court is required to order submission of a
plan only after joint custody is ordered, or does it mean that the plan
should be ordered when the court is considering an award of joint
custody? The former interpretation is at least plausible. The provi-
sion in article 146(A) that the court "require the parents to submit
a plan for implementation of the custody order" implies that the court
need only require a plan after there has been a custody order. This
interpretation is supported by the language which allows parents to
submit a plan "prior to issuance of. a custody decree." It would be
unnecessary to give special permission to the parents to submit a plan
prior to the custody order if, at the same time, the court was already
bound to require the parents to submit a plan. The latter
54. This factor would be related to the nature of the parents' personal relation-
ship, but not coextensive with it. See Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 432 A.2d 63 (1981).
Given the presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of the child, the court
can not assume that just because the marriage failed the parents cannot cooperate
and thus joint custody is not in the best interest of the child.
55. For a discussion of whether the court can order drafting of the joint custody
plan before it considers whether joint custody is in the child's best interest, see text
at infra notes 57 & 58.
56. M. MORGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, supra note 52, at 99-100; M. WHEELER, DIVIDED
CHILDREN 80-81 (1980).
57. The original bill did not require the court to order submission of a plan, but
allowed the court to order a plan in its discretion. La. H.B. 1194, 8th Reg. Sess. (1982)
(as introduced).
The Nevada statute simply provides that the court may require a plan to be sub-
mitted "when appropriate." NEv. REV. STAT. S 125.136 (1981).
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interpretation -the court must order that a plan be submitted when
it is considering joint custody-is a better interpretation, however,
as a matter of policy. This interpretation would allow the court to
examine the specific terms of the plan when deciding whether joint
custody is in the child's best interest.5 Consistent with this interpreta-
tion, the provision allowing the parents to submit their own plan(s)
could be considered a safeguard for parents who desired to submit
a plan but were prevented by the trial judge, who persisted in find-
ing "good cause" not to order submission of the plan. In addition, per-
mitting the parents to submit a plan on their own initiative allows
them an opportunity to show their ability to cooperate-a factor which
will be important in determining whether joint custody is in the child's
best interest. Thus, because the latter interpretation can be rational-
ized and because it is more consistent with the general provision that
custody be awarded in accordance with the best interest of the child,
article 146 should be interpreted as directing the court to require a
joint custody plan when the court is considering an order of joint
custody.
The court, "for good cause shown," may waive the requirement
that it order submission of a plan. A general definition of "good cause"
is difficult to formulate59 and usually depends on the statute in which
the phrase is used, as well as the particular facts of each case."0 Good
cause to waive the requirement of a joint custody plan could result
from a number of different fact situations. There may be good cause
not to order a plan if the parents have already agreed to a suitable
plan, or where the court determines that the parents would not agree
to a suitable plan. In the latter instance, the court may still develop
a plan of its own since nothing in article 146 precludes the court from
imposing its own joint custody plan on the parents if required for
the child's best interest. Although the need for parental cooperation
would seem to require that the parents formulate their own plan, at
least one writer has argued that joint custody ordered by the court
is no more prone to failure than sole custody ordered by the court."
In any event, the threat of the court imposing a plan may encourage
the parents to compromise and submit their own plan.
58. A poorly drafted joint custody plan may result in the failure of the joint
custody arrangement, a result which is not in the child's best interest. See, e.g., Mar-
riage of Heinel & Kessel, 55 Or. App. 275, 637 P.2d 1313 (1981).
59. See Justice Summers' dissent from the refusal to grant writs in Dugas v.
Continental Cas. Co., 249 La. 843, 191 So. 2d 642 (1966). The majority's decision to
refuse to grant writs is at 249 La. 763, 191 So. 2d 141.
60. Wray v. Folsom, 166 F. Supp. 390 (W.D. Ark. 1958).
61. Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C.D.
L. REV. 523, 579 (1979).
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Two provisions in article 146 relate generally to the contents of
joint custody plans. When there is joint custody, "physical care and
custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way as to assure
a child of frequent and continuing contact with both parents." 2 This
language prohibits joint custody plans which would prevent frequent
and continuing contact. Whatever meaning is ultimately attributed
to "frequent and continuing" will limit the contents of joint custody
plans. 3
In addition to the requirement of frequent and continuing con-
tact, the legislation specifically permits four "considerations" to be-
included in joint custody plans: (1) domiciliary arrangements, (2) rights
of access and communication, (3) child support, and (4) any other mat-
ter deemed to. be in the child's best interest." The legislation does
not require that any of these considerations be included in a joint
custody plan. Article 146 simply provides that a plan may include these
considerations. It is especially important that the domiciliary considera-
tion is permissive, since it is limited by the requirement of frequent
and continuing contact.
Each of the first three considerations is intended to allow specific
elements to be included in the joint custody plan. The domiciliary con-
sideration simply pertains to the possible establishment of a single
home for the child. 5 The consideration of rights of access and com-
munication allows provisions implementing the requirement of frequent
and continuing contact between parent and child. In addition to
custody terms, the rights might include allowing a joint custodial
parent to communicate with his child who is in the physical custody
of the other parent. The child support consideration was added to
indicate that an award of joint custody does not preclude an award
of child support to one of the parents. 6 The last consideration is a
catchall which indicates that the contents of a plan are not limited
by the enumeration of considerations in article 146, and anything rele-
vant to the child's best interest can be admitted. Examples of other
considerations which might be included in a plan are provisions ac-
commodating the wishes of the child or designating a mediator or
62. LA. CIV. CODE art. 146(D).
63. The requirement relates to custody, not the custody plan, and thus there is
not an explicit requirement that the plan contain provisions which will assure fre-
quent and continuing contact. Since custody of that nature is required, however, it
would seem reasonable for the court to require the plan to contain provisions which
assure frequent and continuing contact.
64. LA. Civ. CODE art. 146(A)(1).
65. See supra notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text.
66. This is evident from the recorded hearing on La. H.B. 1194 before the House
Committee on Civil Law and Procedure.
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arbitrator in the event disputes arise. 7 Naturally, the central part
of each plan will state the times the child will spend with each parent,
but a plan should also establish a division of decision-making rights
and responsibilities to the extent necessary for the best interest of
the child. 8 A carefully drafted plan will prevent the occasion of many
situations which are harmful to the child.69
Enforcement of Joint Custody Decrees
If a dispute arises following the decree of joint custody, there
are two alternatives for the parents. They can return to court, in which
case each party will try to enforce his or her version of the plan,
or either or both parties will petition for sole custody. The other alter-
native is a nonjudicial resolution of the dispute. The latter alternative
is preferable as an initial means of dispute resolution because it avoids
an adversary court proceeding that places the joint custodial parents
in conflict. A nonjudicial proceeding would allow the possibility of
dispute resolution which promotes cooperation." Furthermore, a non-
judicial approach would more readily accommodate resolution of minor
disputes, possibly preventing them from becoming major disputes.71
In testimony before the legislature, mediation and arbitration were
discussed as preferable methods of resolving these disputes that arise
in joint custody situations.7 1 Mediation involves designation of a
mediator who would aid the parties in reaching settlement when
disputes arose. Arbitration also involves a third party, but in arbitra-
tion the parents would agree to abide by the decisions of the arbitrator
rather than attempt to reach their own settlement. Of these two
options, mediation is preferable because the parents would settle the
dispute themselves, with the help of the mediator, and thus would
be more likely to abide by the settlement. Arbitration, which involves
the imposition of a decision on the parents, is less likely to result
in an acceptable settlement. Arbitration, however, would have the
benefit of keeping the parties out of court, where there is little chance
67. M. MORGANBESSER & N. NEHLS, supra note 52, at 102-03; M. WHEELER, supra note
56, at 82-83.
68. Although upon the award of joint custody the rights and responsibilities of
tutorship will automatically be shared equally, that division of authority can and should
be modified in accordance with the child's best interest. See note 34, supra.
69. Examples of joint custody agreements can be found at 1 A. LINDEY, SEPARA.
TION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS, Forms 14.04, 14.05, 14.11 (1982); M.
MORGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, supra note 52, at 104-10.
70. M. WHEELER, supra note 56, at 206-07.
71. Id. at 82.
72. This is estabished in the recorded hearing on La. H.B. 1194 before the House
Committee on Civil Law and Procedure.
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for cooperation and where both parties will be tempted to pursue sole
custody on the grounds that joint custody has not been successful.
If judicial resolution of disputes becomes necessary, several alter-
native means of enforcement are available. Either party could request
the court to hold the other party in contempt for violating the custody
order. Although it seems unlikely that holding an uncooperative joint
custodial parent in contempt will produce a result that is in the best
interest of the child, contempt, nonetheless, may be used since it has
been recognized in the past as a means of enforcing visitation
privileges."5
If the parents agree to submit a joint custody plan and the court
includes that plan in its judgment awarding joint custody, one of the
parents may attempt to enforce the plan as a contract. 4 This would
involve seeking specific performance or, more probably, damages.75
It is not clear, however, whether the agreement will be enforceable
as a contract. There is some indication in the jurisprudence that
custody is a matter of public order which cannot be the subject of
a contract.76 Furthermore, amended article 146 does not treat the
agreement as a contract in that the joint custody plan can be modified
by the court upon its own motion." This differs from other contracts
between spouses% such 'as matrimonial agreements, which, although
subject to court approval in some instances, cannot be modified by
the court.78 In addition, it is questionable whether contractual liabili-
ty between the parents is appropriate, since custody usually involves
an already volatile situation. The existence of a contract would en-
courage litigation and cause some parents to overreact to otherwise
harmless deviations from the plan. Fear of such litigation might under-
mine the possibility of sincere cooperation between the parents. Final-
ly, a contract would limit the flexibility of the actual custody arrange-
ment by encouraging strict adherence to the plan regardless of changes
in circumstances. For these reasons, treating the agreement as a con-
tract would be inconsistent with, the best interest of the child, which,
after all, is the primary goal of the legislation.
73. .,See Fouchi v. Fouchi, 391 So. 2d 1352 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980), writ denied,
396 So. 2d 918 (La 1981), in which the court indicated that the father's recourse against
the mother, who would not always allow visitation in accordance with the court order,
was to request a contempt citation against the mother.
74. If the parents do not voluntarily agree to the plan, there is no basis for a
claim in contract.
75. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1905, 1926, 1927 & 1934(3).
76. See Roy v. Speer, 249 La. 1034, 192 So. 2d 554 (1966); Farr v. Emuy, 121 La.
91, 46 So. 112 (1908); Cenac v. Power, 211 So. 2d 408 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968); see also
LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1893 & 1895.
77. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146(E).
78. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329.
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Nonetheless, a strong argument can be made that custody
agreements, to a limited extent, should be enforceable as contracts.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that an agreement suspend-
ing child support payments is binding if the agreement is in the best
interest of the child and has all the other elements of a conventional
obligation." Thus, contracts as to child support are not prohibited per
se and may be binding if not contrary to public policy. Other jurisdic-
tions adopt the same rationale with respect to custody arrangements.'
The general principle in these jurisdictions is that the parties cannot
bind the court by their agreement, but if the court finds that the
agreement is in accord with public policy, the agreement will be en-
forced. By analogy to the child support jurisprudence, Louisiana courts
could follow other jurisdictions and allow those custody contracts which
are not contrary to public policy. The limits of public policy, of course,
would be dictated by the best interest of the child under article 146.
No entirely adequate method of enforcing custody agreements
exists. As a result, joint custody may be difficult to maintain except
where both parents desire it. The inadequacy of judicial enforcement
of joint custody may also undermine the arbitration and mediation
alternatives. Parents will realize that they have nothing to lose by
failing to settle their disputes by arbitration or mediation, since if
joint custody fails the court is likely to award sole custody, rather
than attempt to enforce its joint custody order. The ultimate effect
of the enforcement problem may be to discourage joint custody
awards.
Custody Awards to Nonparents
Prior to the amendment of article 146, the legislation did not
recognize the possibility of custody awards to nonparents. The prob-
lem arose in several cases, however, which established the jurispruden-
tial rule that parents had a paramount right to custody and custody
could not be awarded to a nonparent unless both parents were unfit,
unwilling, or unable to accept custody. 1 Under this rule, courts were
hesitant to award custody to a nonparent, even when such award was
in the best interest of the child. 2
79. Dubroc v. Dubroc, 388 So.2d 377 (La. 1980).
80. Crocker v. Crocker, 195 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1952); Bleck v. Bleck, 1 A.D.2d
839, 148 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1956); Ford v. Ford, 242 S.C. 344, 130 S.E.2d 916 (1963); King
v. King, 29 Wis. 2d 550, 131 N.W.2d 357 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
191 (1981).
81. See Jones v. Jones, 415 So. 2d 300 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982); Deville v. LaGrange,
388 So. 2d 696 (La. 1980); Wood v. Beard, 290 So. 2d 675 (La. 1974).
82. See Smith v. Johnson, 415 So. 2d 291 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982); Burt v. McKee,




The provisions of amended article 146 replace the jurisprudential
rule. Article 146, in pertinent part, provides:
[C]ustody shall be awarded in the following order of preference,
according to the best interest of the children:
(3) If to neither parent, to the person or persons in whose
home the child has been living in a wholesome and stable
environment.
(4) To any other person or persons deemed by the court to be
suitable and able to provide an adequate and stable environment.
Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person
or persons other than a parent without the consent of the parents,
it shall make a finding that an award of custody to a parent would
be detrimental to the child and the award to a nonparent is re-
quired to serve the best interest of the child.
The essence of the change is that rather than finding that both parents
are unfit, unwilling, or unable, the court must now find that parental
custody would be detrimental to the child. Whether the law has changed,
as a practical matter, is not clear. Although custody that would be
detrimental to the child would include custody with a parent who was
unfit, unwilling, or unable, there is no indication of whether any other
situation would be included in the definition of "detrimental." To the
extent that other situations are included, the new law reduces the stan-
dard for awarding custody to nonparents.
Rights of Noncustodial Parents
In conjunction with the custody provisions already discussed, ar-
ticle 146(H) states that "[N]otwithstanding any other provision of law,
access to records and information pertaining to a minor child, including
but not limited to medical, dental, and school records, shall not be
denied to a parent because the parent is not the child's custodial
parent." Thus, in addition to visitation rights, the noncustodial parent
has a continuing right to be informed of the child's welfare. This new
right recognizes that the noncustodial parent has a constant interest
in the child, and this right is consistent with the general tenor of
article 146 in that it acknowledges that, despite the breakdown of
the marriage, a child still has two parents.
Conclusion
The apparent purpose of the new law is to curb the dominant
position of the parent with sole custody. The main aspect of the
legislature's effort to achieve this goal is the preference of joint
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custody over sole custody. However, regardless of whether one ac-
cepts or rejects the idea of joint custody and the legislature's pur-
pose in imposing it, the new legislation is disappointing. The law is
unclear in many places and borders on being internally inconsistent
in others. Since any advantages that might have been gained may
well be lost in the imprecision of the new law, the legislature should
act to amend and clarify it."3
Richard C. Guerriero, Jr.
83. A problem beyond the scope of this note but worthy of mention is the absence
of a requirement that joint custody be awarded only to parents domiciled within the
state. Prior to amendment in 1982, Civil Code articles 146 and 157 contained such
a requirement. The new law may cause practical problems since it allows custody to
be awarded to parents who live great distances apart. It may also cause jurisdictional
problems. See generally LA. R.S. 13:1700-1724 (Supp. 1978) (Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Law); Bodenheimer & Kvarme, Jurisdiction Over Child Custody and Adop-
tion After Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 227 (1979).
